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This paper shows that many common methods of privatizing social security fail to reduce 
labor market distortions when taxes are second best, challenging a key reason to 
privatize.  Ironically, providing “transition relief” to workers alive at the time of the 
reform, in an effort to protect their previous contributions, undercuts potential efficiency 
gains.  Chile’s reform -- the first major privatization that also served as a model for 
subsequent countries -- actually increased distortions.  It is then shown that privatization 
with limited transition relief can reduce labor market distortions and produce gains to 
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  While privatizing a pay-as-you-go social security system could increase saving, it 
involves a zero-sum reallocation of resources between generations inside the standard 
neoclassical model with inelastic labor supply.
2  Intuitively, social security does not 
distort the relative price of consumption between calendar dates -- the only margin for 
distortions in this setting.  Any gains to future generations, therefore, must be offset in 
present value with losses to at least one earlier generation.  Discussions about social 
security reform in this context, therefore, are limited to normative debates about different 
inter-generational resource distributions within the set of Pareto-efficient allocations. 
                                                  2
  When labor supply is elastic, social security payroll taxes distort labor supply 
choices relative to first-best taxation.  This distortion stems from the pay-as-you-go 
financing itself.  If the economy is dynamic efficiency (i.e., does not grow at a rate faster 
than interest), workers born into a mature pay-as-you-go social security system receive a 
rate of return on their contributions from social security that is lower than the return that 
they could have earned in the capital market.  This lower yield produces an effective net 
tax rate on earnings that, although less than the statutory tax rate, is positive and 
potentially large, especially for younger workers who face the compound effects of 
foregone interest over their remaining work life (Feldstein and Samwick, 1992). 
  Privatizing social security when labor supply is elastic could increase economic 
efficiency if the government had access to first-best taxes (Breyer and Straub, 1993; 
Feldstein, 1996; Feldstein and Liebman, 2002).  In other words, existing pay-as-you-go 
social security systems create excess burden in the traditional sense of Hicks (1943, 
1944-5) and Harberger (1974).  However, if the government had access to first-best taxes, 
then these efficiency gains could be achieved even without privatization. 
  It is also interesting to know, therefore, if privatization could produce efficiency 
gains if the government’s policy instruments are restricted to be second-best labor income 
taxes.  As Brunner (1996) demonstrates, such a gain is not possible in a standard two-
period overlapping-generations model where agents work for the first period and retire 
the second period.  Allowing workers to divert their pay-as-you-go payroll taxes to 
private accounts would require levying a new labor income tax on workers in order to 
continue to pay the social security benefits of those retired at the time of this reform.    3
This reform would simply substitute one distorting tax for another, producing no gains.
3  
This result, therefore, seriously challenges a key rational for privatization. 
  The current paper demonstrates that, in a model with three or more periods, 
privatization can produce efficiency gains in the presence of elastic labor supply even 
when only second-best labor income taxes are available.  With multiple periods, a 
household’s accrued benefit (which is observable by the government) becomes a source 
for an efficient implicit lump sum tax that can be used to replace the future revenue that 
would have been collected using a distorting labor income tax.  Equivalently, this implicit 
wealth levy can afford participants a higher return on their future contributions, thereby 
reducing the effective tax rate on their labor supply. 
  To understand this result intuitively, consider the following experiment. Suppose 
that households work for two periods and retire the third period.  The government 
suddenly decides that it no longer recognizes the Social Security benefits that the second-
period period workers accrued during their first period of life.  In exchange for this 
implicit wealth levy, however, the government gives these workers the capital market rate 
of return on a portion of their second-period contributions (i.e., privatizes a portion of 
their second-period contributions). The portion of second-period contributions invested in 
the capital market is set to produce a revenue loss equal in present value to the implicit 
wealth levy at the pre-reform level of labor supply. 
  Workers are clearly better off under this experiment because they are fully 
compensated for their losses in present value but they now face better labor supply 
incentives.  The government's inter-temporal budget constraint is also improved because 
labor supply unambiguously increases, which helps future generations by lowering taxes. 
                                                 
3 Brunner’s equivalent approach shows that lump-sum taxes do not respect intra-generational heterogeneity.   4
  To capture these gains, however, the privatization experiment must be designed 
correctly.  This paper shows that several common privatization plans fail to produce 
efficiency gains since they provide “transition relief” to workers alive at the time of the 
reform in order to protect their previous contributions.  This outcome is somewhat ironic 
since the relief is typically given in an attempt to avoid generating losers.  It is then 
shown that a privatization with limited transition relief can reduce labor market 
distortions and produce gains to current and future generations without hurting initial 
retirees (i.e., a Pareto gain) even if the government’s taxes are second best. 
  Section 2 outlines the pre-reform economy with a pay-as-you-go social security 
system.  Section 3 shows how several standard privatization plans fail to produce 
efficiency gains.  Section 4 shows how privatization with limited transition relief can 
produce efficiency gains while respecting worker heterogeneity.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. THE PRE-REFORM ECONOMY 
  This section describes the economy before social security is reformed. 
2.1.   Demographics and Factor Prices 






N n N −
≡ .  The total wage base time t grows at a gross rate  t G ≡ () 1 t g +≡  
() ( ) 11 t nx ++  , where x is the exogenous and constant rate of technological change 
between time periods.  We assume that the population is stationary and so we drop the 
time subscripts for N and G in the subsequent discussion.  The gross rate of return to risk-
less capital is  () 1 R r =+, where r is the net rate of return.  The wage rate at time t is t w ,   5
which grows at rate x, i.e.,  ( ) 1 1 tt wx w + =+ .  These factor prices are stationary (or, in the 
case of wages, trend stationary) as in a small open economy or with linear technology.   
2.2.   Households 
 Agent  j is born at time t and lives for three periods.  The agent has exogenous 
levels of productivity of  1
j α  and  2
j α  in the first and second periods, respectively, which 
are indexed by j to allow for heterogeneity.  Productivity in the third period is zero.   










β− ∑ , where  ,
j
kt c  is the level of 
consumption at age k and  ,
j
kt l  is the level of labor supply where the total time endowment 
each period is normalized to unity.  The function u(,) is increasing and concave in both 
arguments.  Our focus on “compensated” reforms requires no restrictions on the cross-
partial derivatives of u(,).  Lifetime utility is maximized subject to: 
(1)  () 1, 1, 1 1, 1
jj j j
tt t t ca w l += α − τ   
(2)   () 2, 1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 1, 1
jj j j j
tt t t t ca w l R a ++ + + += α − τ + 
(3)   3, 2 2, 1 2
jj j
tt t cR a b ++ + =+   
where b is the pay-as-you-go social security benefit received in the third period financed 
on a pay-as-you-go basis with a proportional tax,τ, on labor earnings.
4  By construction, 
this tax is second-best since, as in the original optimal tax problem of Mirrlees, the 
government can observe labor earnings but not productivity (or hours worked). 
 
 
                                                 
4 The rest of the government’s operations outside of social security are ignored in this paper for simplicity.  
Including them would not impact the results herein.  Indeed, if capital income taxes were also in place, 
additional gains from privatization could be obtained, as shown in Feldstein and Liebman (2002).   6
2.3.   Social Security 
Over 150 countries have defined-benefit social security systems that are mostly 
pay-as-you-go financed.  In most cases, benefits are proportional to the average of past 
earnings; in a few countries like the United States, benefits paid relative to previous 
earnings are decreasing in the value of average past earnings, although some of this 
redistribution might be offset by differences in mortality and spousal qualifications.
5   
2.3.1. Proportional Benefits 
We initially, therefore, focus on a social security system where benefits are 
proportional to previous contributions.  In this system, every agent gets the same gross 
“internal” rate of return to their social security contributions.  In a mature and stationary 
pay-as-you-go system, this internal rate of return is equal to the growth rate of the wage 




21 1 , 2 1 2 , 1
jj j j j
tt t t t bGw l G w l ++ + =τ α + τ α   
2.3.2. Age-Specific Marginal Net Tax Rates 
 The  net social security tax paid by agent j at a given age equals the value of taxes 
paid at that age less the present value of future benefits received from that tax.  For agents 
born into a mature pay-as-you-g social security system, these taxes are as follows: 
(5)  () ( )
22
1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1
jj j j j j j
tt t t t t t GG Tw l w l w l RR
 ≡ τα − τα = − τα  
  
(6)  () ( ) 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 1
jj j j j j j
tt t t t t t GG Tw l w l w l RR ++ + + + + +  ≡τ α − τ α = − τ α

  
(7)  3, 2 0
j
t T + =   
                                                 
5 See, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001). 
6 I.e., In a stationary economy with a single type of household (to reduce notation), equation (4) can be 
rewritten as the standard pay-as-you-go constraint,  22 1 2 1 , 2 1 2 2 2 , 2 tt t t t t t t Nb N w l N w l + ++ + ++ + =τ α +τ α .   7
  In other words, the budget constraints (1) – (4) could be rewritten as  
(1’)  1, 1, 1 1, 1,
jj j jj
tt t tt ca w lT += α −    
(2’)   2, 1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 1, 2, 1
jj j j j j
tt t t t t ca w lR a T ++ + + + += α +−   
(3’)   3, 2 2, 1
jj
tt cR a ++ =   
Agent j is indifferent between constraints (1) – (4) and constraints (1’) – (3’).  We will 
use this fact in some of the results shown in Section 3. 
  The implicit effective marginal net tax rates on wages indicate how much the net 
taxes increase with wage income earned at a particular age in life: 
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
  
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2, 1
2, 1











∂   τ≡ = − τ
  ∂α

  . 
(10)  3, 2 0
j
t+ τ≡    
  We focus on a dynamically efficient economy, which implies R > G;
7 otherwise, 
expanding pay-as-you-go financing would be Pareto improving (Samuelson, 1958).   The 
marginal tax rates faced by agent j at ages 1 and 2, therefore, are positive but below the 
statutory tax rate, τ.  Also notice that  2, 1 1,
jj
tt + τ <τ  , i.e., the net marginal tax rate decreases 
in the agent j’s age as the “compound effect” of the ( ) G
R  wedge is reduced. 
 
                                                 
7 See Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989) for evidence of dynamic efficiency.  With a capital 
income tax, however, it is possible that R > G while the after-tax return to capital is equal to or less than G.  
In this case, social security still distorts labor supply relative to first-best taxes where workers could save at 
rate R.  As shown by Feldstein and Liebman (2002), privatization could produce efficiency gains even with 
inelastic labor supply in the presence of a capital income tax.  As footnoted earlier, these gains could also 
be achieved by reforming the tax system (i.e., without privatization), and so it is interesting to know if 
efficiency gains could be achieved with just labor income taxes.   8
2.4.   Government’s Budget Constraint 
 Let  () 1, 2, 1 1 jj j
tt t TT R + Γ≡ +  ,  the present value of the net lifetime Social Security 
taxes paid by the j agent born at time t.  The aggregate net lifetime taxes paid by people 






Γ ∫ .  The government’s inter-temporal budget constraint 












Γ= ∑ ∫ , 
where Social Security is assumed to have begun at time 0. (X is a stationary cumulative 
measure of households corresponding to the set, E, of potential age-productivity vectors.) 
To reduce notation and without much loss in generality, we ignore the other types of 
(non-social security) goods and services that are typically provided by the government. 
  Constraint (11) is quite general and incorporates both pay-as-you-go and funded 
social security systems.  It can be shown that the constraint (11) is implied by the more-
restrictive pay-as-you-go funding constraint, equation (4), when R > G.  The converse, 
however, is not true, i.e., the equation (11) does not imply equation (4). 
  Under the pay-as-you-go constraint (4), equation (11) has the interpretation that 
the windfalls to retirees and older workers alive at time 0 are financed by the sum of net 
taxes paid by future generations in present value.  In particular, rewrite equation (11) as  
(12)  () () ()
Net Taxes Paid by Generations     0








t jE jE jE
N
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, 
where generation -2 represents the third-period agents (retirees) alive when the social 
security system began at time 0, and generation -1 represents the second-period agents   9
(older workers) alive at time 0.  The present value (as of time 0) of the windfall to agent j 
of generation -2 is 
2
2
j R − −Γ  = 
2
1, 2 2, 1
jj R TR T − − −−   = 
2
12 1 , 2 21 2 , 1
jj jj Gw lG w l − −− − τα + τα , which by 
equation (4) is equal to  0
j b .
8  The present value windfall to agent j of generation -1, 
though, is more complicated.  Like generation -2, generation -1 receives benefits based 
on their entire lifetime of wages.  But, unlike generation -2, generation -1 pays taxes 
during their second period.  Hence,  1
j R − − Γ  =  1, 1 2,0
jj RTT − −−   = 
2






 -  20 2 , 0
jj wl τα  
+ () 20 2 , 0
jj G wl R τα  = 
1





−τα .  Hence, we can rewrite (12) as  
() () () ()
Net Taxes Paid by Generatio Benefits Paid to Generations -2 and -1
Taxes Paid in 2nd Period by Generation -1
1
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N b
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2.4.1. “Actuarially-Fair” Reforms 
  Since this paper focuses on efficiency gains, we consider “actuarially-fair” 
reforms, that is, reforms that do not change the present value of net lifetime taxes of any 
household at pre-reform levels of labor income, i.e., reforms for which the value of 
j
t Γ  
remains unchanged at pre-reform levels of labor supply. 
  It is important to distinguish between fair reforms and a fair initial social security 
system.  When R > G, a pay-as-you-go social security system is actuarially unfair to 
generations born into it since they must pay for the windfall gain to previous generations 
who received more in benefits in present value than they paid in taxes.  However, the 
                                                 
8 Recall that equations (5) and (6) apply to agents who are born into a mature pay-as-you-go social security 
system.  For generation -2,  ()
2
1, 2 1 2 1, 2
jj j G Tw l R −− − ≡− τ α   and  ( ) 2, 1 2 1 2, 1
jj j G Tw l R − −− ≡− τ α  .   10
reforms we consider herein are actuarially fair when judge against the market rate, R, in 
that they do not change the resource allocation either inter- or intra-generationally. 
  The focus on actuarially-fair reforms does not constrain the analysis in the current 
deterministic-wage setting because the efficiency gains we derive herein come from 
reducing the distortions of those alive at the time of the reform, not from reducing 
distortions (or completing missing markets) either within or between generations.  In a 
model with uninsurable idiosyncratic wage uncertainty but no aggregate risk, it may be 
possible to create a Pareto improving reform that does not change the inter-generational 
allocation of resources but improves intra-generational risk sharing.
9  In a model with 
aggregate uncertainty and incomplete trading markets between generations, state-
contingent reallocations of resources across generations might improve risk sharing.
10  
The deterministic framework herein rules out these additional potential margins.
11 
 
3. TWO COMMON PRIVATIZATION PROPOSALS 
This section shows that two common proposals to privatize social security fail to 
produce efficiency gains; Chile’s privatization, in fact, reduced efficiency. 
3.1.   The “Carve Out” 
  One way of introducing personal accounts is to “carve out” a portion of an agent’s 
social security payroll tax and to deposit the money into a personal account.  Since an 
                                                 






Γ ∫  is unchanged for all t but the values of 
j
t Γ  could change. 
10 See, for example, Bohn (2003), Krueger and Kubler (2002) and Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003). 
 
11 In so doing, however, we also ignore the possible risk sharing advantages of the pre-reform social 
security system relative to a privatized system.  Nishiyama and Smetters (2004) consider these competing 
effects using a large-scale lifecycle simulation model.  The current paper focuses on demonstrating the 
potential source of efficiency gains from privatization, which is not widely understood.   11
agent pays less money into the traditional defined-benefit social security system, her 
future social security benefit is reduced by an equal amount in present value.  Carve out 
plans are the most common type of reforms being discussed for the U.S. system, 
including by the recent 2001 President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security. 
  Suppose that a portion π of the payroll tax,τ, is carved out and placed into a 
personal account while the remaining ( ) 1−π  of τ continues to be paid to social security.  
Dropping time subscripts to reduce clutter, the new budget constraints are 
(13)  [ ] () ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 11 1
jj j j j j ca w l w l + =α −τ π−τ −π =α −τ   
(14)   () [ ] () ( )() 22 2 2 1 2 2 1 11 1 11
jj j j j j j j ca x w l R a x w l R a += α+ − τ π − τ − π + = α+ − τ +  
(15)   32
jj j cR ab =+ , 
where 
j b  is now the third-period assets that are in the new carve-out personal account 
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2
2
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Notice that after the algebraic reductions shown in equations (13) – (16), these 
constraints are identical to the original budget constraints (1) – (4).  As a result, the 
marginal net tax rates are unaffected by the introduction of an actuarially-fair carve out.  
In other words, this reform is economically neutral between and within generations: 
   12
Proposition 1.  The actuarially-fair “carve out,” where a household’s future social 
security benefit is reduced equal in present value to the payroll taxes they divert to their 
private account, is neutral.  In particular, labor supply incentives are not improved. 
 
Intuitively, on one hand, lowering the tax rate paid into the traditional pay-as-you-
go social security system reduces marginal tax rates across all ages.  On the other hand, 
the concomitant benefit reduction has the effect of increasing the marginal tax rate on 
contributions, raising the marginal tax rates back to their pre-reform levels.  The fair 
carve out reform, therefore, is completely neutral. 
3.2.   The “Shutdown” with Recognition Bonds 
  Another reform would “shut down” the social security system altogether and 
avoid harming workers in the transition by depositing recognition bonds into their 
personal accounts; retirees at the time of the reform continue to receive the same benefits 
as under social security.  The recognition bonds plus the benefits paid to the initial 
retirees are financed in present value by a set of new labor income taxes described below. 
3.2.1. Second-Period Workers at the Time of the Reform 
  Consider middle-age (second-period) workers alive at the start of the reform who 
accrued benefits under social security.  Their new budget constraints are as follows:   
(17)  () 11 1 1 1
jj j j ca w l += α − τ   
(18)   () 22 2 2 1 22 1
jj j j j jj ca x w lR aBT += α+ + +−   
(19)   32
jj cR a = , 
where the budget constraint, (17), during the first period of life under social security in 
included for completeness.  The recognition bond,  2













which is calculated by grossing up previous contributions by the internal rate of return 
that agent j would have received under social security during the third year of life and 
then discounting it to give a present value as of the second period of life. 
 The  pure  tax  2
j T  , shown in equation (18), which is levied after the reform takes 
place in the second period of life, is defined in equation (6).  It represents this 
generation’s share of taxes that are needed to support the benefits paid to initial retirees. 
  Substituting the values of  2
j B  and  2
j T   into equation (18) leaves the following set 
of budget constraints 
(17’)  () 11 1 1 1
jj j j ca w l += α − τ   
(18’)   ()() ( )
2
11 2 2




jj j j j wl G w x l G
ca x w l R a
R
  τα + τα +
+= α+ − τ + +  
 
 
(19’)   32
jj cR a = , 
Notice that the value in the [ ] brackets is equal to the present value (as of the second 
period) of the social security benefit shown in equation (4).  Notice that this set of budget 
constraints is identical to the original budget constraints (1) – (4), thereby leading to no 
reductions in labor supply distortions. 
3.2.2. Young and Future Generations at the Time of the Reform 
  After the shutdown, young and future generations do not pay social security taxes 
or receive any social security benefits.  They also do not receive any recognition bonds 
since they have not accrued any benefits by the time of the reform.  However, they must   14
help finance the social security benefits that were paid to the initial retirees at the time of 
the privatization plus the value of recognition bonds. 
  Given the revenue from the pure labor tax,  2
j T  , that is paid by second-period 
workers alive at the time of the privatization (shown above), it can be shown that the 
remaining unfunded liabilities can be financed exactly in present value if all future 
workers pay a pure labor tax equal to  1
j T   during the first period and  2
j T   during the second 
period, as shown in budget constraints (1’) – (3’).
12  The equivalence of these budget 
constraints with constraints (1) – (4) implies that young workers and future workers are 
indifferent to the shutdown as well, which proves the following result: 
 
Proposition 2.  The actuarially-fair “shut down,” where social security is eliminated 
(except for current retirees) and recognition bonds are given to workers in lieu of their 
accrued benefits, is neutral.  In particular, labor supply incentives are not improved. 
 
3.3.   Remark on Rational Expectations 
  Propositions 1 and 2 assume that people know the marginal tax-benefit linkage 
under the pre-reform system, i.e., they have rational expectations. This calculation is 
difficult in practice, and so these two privatizations could increase efficiency indirectly 
by distinguishing between the effective (pure) tax rates and the statutory tax rate.  This 
type of gain has been explored in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, Chapter 10).  The 
current paper instead explores whether gains are possible even with rational expectations. 
                                                 
12 In practice, the government would presumably issue new debt to finance the benefits of the initial 
retirees.  The new pure taxes for middle-aged and future workers shown in the text can then be interpreted 
as the interest payments on the rollover of this new debt plus recognition bonds into perpetuity.   15
3.4.   Chile’s Reform 
  When Chile privatized its social security system during the early 1980s, it used a 
slightly different calculation of the recognition bonds relative to the actuarially-fair 
method that was shown above.  In particular, the Chilean government simply grossed up 
previous contributions by the market interest rate, R, instead of by the internal rate of 
return under the previous system, G.  In effect, the government calculated the bond as 
21 1 ˆ jj j B wl R =τ α , which is more-than actuarially fair when R > G since  22 ˆ jj B B > . 
 The  extra,  22 ˆ jj B B − , represents a windfall to second-period households that had to 
be financed with distorting labor income taxes.  As will be clear from the analysis 
presented in the next section, this windfall effectively increases the value of accrued 
benefits and, therefore, works exactly in the opposite direction that is needed to reduce 
labor supply distortions.  In the current model, therefore, the Chilean reform produced a 
Pareto inferior outcome.  Of course, in reality, the Chilean reform potentially had many 
political-economy advantages that are not captured in the standard model herein. 
  In contrast, the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security proposed 
two plans that included voluntary “carve outs” that were more-than actuarially fair in the 
sense that these plans proposed reducing the present value of future Social Security 
benefits by less than the amount of dollars that workers carve out into their own personal 
accounts.  This windfall is intended to entice workers to choose the accounts.  Unlike the 
overpayment in the case of recognition bonds, however, it is easy to show that this 
“windfall” is not a source of inefficiency since it is only applied to new contributions.  On 
one hand, this subsidy reduces the effective tax rate on contributions.  On the other hand, 
the windfall must be financed with new distorting pure taxes.  The net effect is a wash.   16
4. REDUCING LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS 
This section shows how privatization can be structured in way that reduces labor 
supply distortions and potentially produces a Pareto gain.  
4.1.  Privatization with Limited Transition Relief 
Consider the following privatization plan: 
•  Retirees at time of reform get paid benefits under current law. 
•  Workers in the second period at the time of the reform lose their accrued benefits, 
which has a value equal to  2
j B  during the second period.  In exchange, their labor 
taxes are reduced the same amount in present value.  This step can be accomplished 
in at least two different ways (or a combination of both):
  
o  An “accrued carve out”: Decrease the traditional benefits received the following 
period by  2
j RB  and decrease traditional second-period payroll taxes by the amount 
of benefits previously accrued,  2
j B . 
o  A “shut down” without recognition bonds: Eliminate social security benefits and 
collect  2
j T   -  2
j B  in taxes during the second period to help service the benefits paid 
to initial retirees. 
•  First-period workers and all future generations pay nothing into social security and 
receive no benefits.  Instead, they pay a pure tax  1
j T   during the first period of life and 
2
j T   during the second period of life to help service the benefits paid to initial retirees. 
 
  Notice taxes do not go to zero even in the long run under this policy change 
because benefits must still be paid to retirees at the time of the reform; tax payments the   17
remain are of equal value in present value.
13  However, the accrued benefits owed to 
second period workers alive at the time of the reform do not have to be paid.  As shown 
below, this lump-sum wealth levy is a source of efficiency gains. 
4.2.   Efficiency Gains 
  This privatization plan holds harmless the retirees at the time of the reform.   
Young and future workers are also directly held harmless since they face the same 
effective budget constraints after privatization, (1’) – (3’), as they did before, (1) – (4).  
We show below, however, that future workers gain indirectly from this privatization plan 
due to improvements in the government’s budget constraint. 
4.2.1. Middle-Aged Workers 
  Any reductions in labor supply distortions, therefore, must come from second-
period workers alive when privatization is introduced who accrued benefits under the 
former social security system.  These gains are easy to demonstrate, which we now show. 
  Recall, that as shown in Section 3, agent j in their second period of life when 
privatization is introduced is indifferent between the initial social security system, shown 
in constraints (1) – (4), versus a privatized system where he or she receives their accrued 
liability,  2
j B , and where they pay the tax labor tax,  2
j T  , as shown in constraints (17) – 
(19).  That was the reason the actuarially-fair shutdown discussed in Section 3 is neutral. 
  In the privatization plan just outlined above, however, the accrued benefit,  2
j B , is 
“defaulted” upon, i.e., not paid.  Instead the pure tax,  2
j T  , paid during the second period is 
lowered by the amount,  2
j B .  Specifically, the proportional pure tax rate paid on second-
                                                 
13 In practice, the government would issue new debt to finance the benefits of the initial retirees and the tax 
payments on subsequent generations shown in the text would exactly service the debt into perpetuity.   18
period labor income decreases from  ( ) 1 G
R
  − τ
 













, where  ()
*
22 1
jj wx l α+ is the deterministic amount of 
second-period labor income (observable to the government in the second best setting) 
before privatization.
14  Since this tax reduction is “compensated” with an implicit levy on 
accrued benefits, it follows that agent j supplies more labor and achieves more utility. 
  These results are illustrated in Figure 1.  The level of leisure is shown on the 
vertical axis while the present value of remaining consumption is on the horizontal axis.  
The line A–X corresponds to the original budget constraint under the original social 
security program where a second-period agent faces the tax rate  () 1 G
R
  − τ
 
 on labor 
income during the second period of life and has accrued a social security benefit of  2
j B  
and private savings,  1 a .  The optimal choice between leisure and consumption is point O. 
 
                                                 
14 The new tax rate comes from solving  ( ) 22 2 2 ˆ 1









I2  I1   19
  Privatization produces two effects.  First, the reduction in the proportional labor 
income tax rate creates a new budget set X–B in Figure 1 as the relative price of 
consumption decreases, increasing the maximum amount of consumption from Point A to 
B.  Second, the loss in the accrued benefit  2
j B  shifts the budget constraint X–B 
downward to Y–C.  Line Y–C intersects with the original budget constraint X–A at the 
original optimum, O, since agent j can still afford the optimal bundle of consumption and 
leisure before privatization.  However, the new budget constraint Y–C affords a higher 
level of utility, as shown by the outward shift of the indifference curve from  1 I t o   2 I.    
 Notice  that  agent  j also supplies more labor.  The government’s budget constraint, 
therefore, also improves by this policy change since more revenue is collected from the 
taxes that remain on the second-period workers.  In general equilibrium, therefore, young 
and future workers also gain from privatization since their tax rates must be lowered in 
order to satisfy the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint, (11).
15 
 
Proposition 3.  Privatization with limited transition relief, as outlined above, increases 
the utility of current and future workers without decreasing the utility of current retirees, 
i.e., a Pareto improvement even with second-best labor income taxes. 
 
4.3. Implementation  Issues 
  A few practical issues emerge in the implementation of privatization.  First, notice 
that the financial institution of “personal accounts” is not explicitly modeled.  The reason 
is that agents are rational in the current model and so they don’t need to be told to save.  
                                                 
15 Of course, these gains could also be shared with current retirees by increasing their benefits.   20
Suppose, though, that policymakers believe that households’ place a weight on future 
utility,β, that is “too low,” thereby generating too little saving after reform.
16 To address 
this problem, the contribution rate in the new system could be set at the same rate as 
under the pre-reform program; the difference between the new contribution rate and the 
new pure taxes that are needed to service the benefits of the initial retirees would then be 
deposited into mandatory personal accounts.  The efficiency gains derived earlier would 
still materialize because second-period workers would get a higher rate of return on their 
contributions into personal accounts when the economy is dynamically efficient (R > G). 
  Second, notice that the net taxes for young and future workers in the new system 
decrease by age,  21
jj τ< τ  .  As shown in Section 2, effective tax rates also decrease in the 
traditional system; the pure tax rates simply become more explicit in the new system.  In 
practice, however, if the personal accounts were mandatory (for reasons just discussed), 
the pure taxes could be implemented indirectly by depositing less into personal accounts 
for young workers relative to older workers with the same labor income. 
  Third, the new pure tax rate on some second-period households alive immediately 
after privatization could go negative (a wage subsidy), especially for those households 
that accumulated enough benefits under social security.
17  A negative wage tax, though, is 
not itself a problem: a wage subsidy will also produce a higher level of labor supply and 
utility, as shown in Figure 1, if it is financed with a reduction in accrued benefits.  If 
contributions to personal accounts were mandatory, this subsidy could take the form of a 
government match of personal contributions that is phased out over time.  Alternatively, 
                                                 
16 This behavior could be irrational (i.e., myopia) or rational (i.e., the Samaritan’s dilemma / moral hazard). 












 is negative if  2
j B is sufficiently large.   21
the government could instead set tax rates to zero and give the household the remainder 
as a partial recognition bond.  But, relative to the match, this bond would reduce the 
implicit lump-sum tax on accrued assets, thereby mitigating some of the gains. 
  Fourth, in the few countries where social security benefits are progressive (e.g., 
the United States), the accrued value of social security benefits at the time of the reform 
also depend on future labor income.  In the deterministic second-best setting herein, the 
government could forecast future labor income (although not wages) with perfect 
foresight, and so incorporating a progressive benefit schedule is not a problem.  In the 
presence of wage uncertainty, however, a reasonable projection would have to be made. 
4.4.   A Back-of-the Envelope Calculation 
  It is interesting to get a sense of the potential gains from privatization.  In the U.S. 
Social Security system, the value of accrued liabilities for current participants is to equal 
about $12 trillion.  About $3 trillion worth belong to retirees no longer in the labor force.  
That leaves about $9 trillion available for reductions in labor supply distortions. 
  Somewhat, conservatively, suppose that workers above age about 55 were exempt 
from reform and so only about $5 trillion of accrued benefits would be subject to a wealth 
levy.  If the excess burden of the U.S. payroll were about 20% (consistent with estimates 
in Feldstein, 1996), then privatization could induce about $1000 billion in efficiency 
gains.
18  Recent estimates by Prescott (2004) of the labor supply elasticity suggest that 
even larger marginal excess burdens are possible. 
  These calculations, though, should be interpreted with caution.  For example, they 
ignore the administrative costs of personal accounts relative to social security (Diamond, 
                                                 
18 For the U.S. system, Feldstein (1996) estimates the excess burden equal to 2.35 percent of the payroll tax 
base, or about 20% of the payroll tax revenue.  In that same article, he estimates even larger gains from 
privatization relative to first-best taxes.   22
1996).  They also ignore how a social security system shares various types of risk over 
the lifecycle that might be hard to insure in the private sector (Diamond, 1977). 
  Rather, the purpose of this paper is to provide the theoretical underpinnings for 
how privatization could produce efficiency gains in a rational expectations environment 
with second-best taxes.  Incorporating the insurance features of the social security system 
requires the use of numerical analysis.  Toward this end, Nishiyama and Smetters (2004) 
simulate privatization using a large-scale lifecycle model with elastic labor supply and 
uninsurable shocks that weighs the tradeoff between reducing labor supply distortions 
and reducing the insurance previously provided by the traditional social security system. 
 4.5.   Comparison with the Standard “Carve Out” and “Shutdown”  
It is now quite straightforward to see that the reason that the standard “carve out” 
and “shutdown” privatizations considered earlier failed to produce efficiency gains is that 
neither approach imposes an implicit lump-sum levy on accrued liabilities.  The “carve 
out” implicitly preserves accrued liabilities by only reducing benefits made on new 
contributions; the “shut down” explicitly preserves accrued liabilities with recognition 
bonds.  Ironically, attempting to provide relief to workers in the transition actually 
undermines the potential source of efficiency gains.  In the case of Chile and some other 
countries, these workers were actually over protected, which induced losses. 
4.6.  Can the Same Efficiency Gains be achieved with Other Reforms? 
The privatization with limited transition relief considered in this section imposes 
an implicit lump-sum wealth levy that is used to reduce future distorting taxes.  This 
policy change is similar in spirit to replacing a wage tax with a consumption tax: a 
consumption tax is equivalent to a wage tax plus a lump-sum tax on existing assets.     23
A legitimate question, therefore, is whether the same efficiency gains derived 
herein could be obtained by simply adopting a consumption tax.  The answer is no.  The 
switch to a consumption tax redistributes resources across generations by implicitly 
imposing a lump-sum tax on non-social security wealth held by households alive at the 
time of the reform, thereby reducing the tax rates on subsequent generations.  Unlike the 
privatization considered in this section, social security wealth in many countries, 
including the U.S., would not be taxed because benefits are protected in real after-tax 
terms (including price increases due to a retail sales tax or a value-added tax).  Moreover, 
even if inflation protection rules were removed, a consumption tax could not isolate the 
benefits accrued under social security and, therefore, could not confiscate them altogether 
in a revenue-neutral fashion.  Hence, some efficiency gains would still remain.  Finally, 
as a practical matter, protecting retirees from the losses of a consumption tax requires 
detailed transition rules; in contrast, privatization avoids inter-generational transfers. 
A related question is whether the same gains from privatization could be achieved 
within the traditional social security system.  If, for example, the government effectively 
defaulted on accrued benefits and reduced payroll taxes, that approach would be no 
different than the privatized experiment considered earlier.  Instead, therefore, the 
government would have to default on accrued benefits and used this implicit lump-sum 
tax to produce a larger internal rate of return on future contributions for current workers.  
With this approach, though, younger workers would continue to accrue benefits under the 
traditional social security system and so they should expect future wealth levies as well, 
which produces a new set of marginal tax rates.  In contrast, the wealth levy on accrued 
benefits in the privatization experiment considered herein can be done only once because   24
the social security system is eventually abandoned.  Instead, future wealth levies would 




  It is generally believed that privatization of social security does not produce 
efficiency gains when the government’s tax instruments are second best.  Much of this 
conventional wisdom, though, has been developed within the standard two-period 
lifecycle model where agents work the first period and retire the second period.   
Intuitively, the government must issue new debt after privatization in order to pay for the 
benefits of the initial elderly.  This debt must be serviced with a distorting tax, which 
produces the same effective tax rates as under the previous social security system.  In 
other words, privatization simply swaps one distorting tax for another. 
  This paper demonstrates that a Pareto improvement is possible in a lifecycle 
model with three or more periods where older workers have accrued benefits under the 
traditional system.  Accrued benefits become a source for an efficient wealth levy used to 
afford a larger (capital market) rate of return on future contributions, thereby reducing the 
effective tax rate on labor at the margin.  A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests 
that the efficiency gains for the U.S. could exceed $1 trillion, although, as explained in 
Section 4, this calculation should be interpreted with some caution.    25
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